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Abstract
We present a model of labor market equilibrium in which managers are risk-
averse, managerial talent (“alpha”) is scarce, and firms seek alpha, that is,
compete for this talent. Firms provide efficient long-term compensation, which
allows for learning about managerial talent and assigning of managers to tasks
based on their talent, when managers are not mobile across firms. In this
case, firms can insure low-quality managers since high-quality managers have
limited outside options. In contrast, when managers can move across firms,
high-quality managers can fully extract ex post the rents due to their skill,
which prevents firms from providing co-insurance among their employees. In
anticipation, risk-averse managers may churn across firms before their perfor-
mance is fully learnt and thereby prevent their efficient assignment to tasks.
The result is excessive risk-taking with pay for short-term performance and
build up of long-term risks. As the model is suited for the financial sector, we
conclude with analysis of policies to address the externality in compensation
among financial firms.
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“The dirty secret of bank bonuses is that these practices have arisen not merely
due to a culture of arrogance; the more pernicious problem is a sense of insecurity.
Banks operate in a world where their star talent is apt to jump between different
groups, whenever a bigger pay-packet appears, with scant regard for corporate loyalty
or employment contracts. The result is that the compensation committees of many
banks feel utterly trapped. ... [A]s one banker says: “These bonuses are crazy - we all
know that. But we don’t know how to stop paying them without losing our best staff.”
Against that background, what the members of some compensation committees are
quietly starting to conclude is that the only real solution is to start clamping down
on the whole “transfer” game. “If Fifa can stop clubs poaching other players and
ripping up contracts, then why can’t the banks do the same?” asks one... It is time,
in other words, for bankers and regulators to take a leaf out of football’s book and
start debating not just the issue of pay, but also the poaching culture that is at the
root of those huge bonus figures.” – Tett (2009)
1 Introduction
Excess risk-taking by financial institutions and overly generous managerial pay are
regarded by many as key factors contributing to the 2007-09 crisis.1 In particular, it
has become commonplace to blame banks and securities companies for offering com-
pensation packages that reward managers (and more generally, other risk-takers such
as traders and salesmen) generously for undertaking investments with high returns
in the short run but with large “tail risks” that emerge only in the long run. As
governments have been forced to rescue failing financial institutions, politicians and
the media have stressed the need that managerial pay packages be cut and incentive
systems based on options and bonuses be reined in, made more sensitive to long-term
performance, and in some extreme cases be outright eliminated.2 As the huge costs of
bank rescues have become apparent, political pressure for such executive pay curbs
has mounted around the world. It is natural to ask whether these limitations to
1See, for example, Rajan (2005, 2008), Richardson and Walter (2009) and Bebchuk, Cohen and
Spamann (2009).
2For instance, in 2008 the German government included in its bank bailout plan the clause that
banks accepting state aid must cap annual salaries of their executives at Euro 500,000, and may also
be required to forgo bonuses and dividend payments. Similarly, in early 2009 the U.S. government
has imposed a cap of $500,000 on the compensation of top executives at companies that received
significant federal assistance. Also in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland, governments
have set limits on financiers’ compensation as part of their efforts to rescue their banking systems.
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managerial pay are the right policy response to the problem, or are simply dictated
by public anger at the wrongdoings of financial institutions’ managers. Indeed, it is
crucial to ask what is in fact the root of the problem, that is, which market failure
in compensation practices has led to rewards for short-term pay at the expense of a
build-up of tail risks.
The argument that we explore in this paper is that the root of the problem is the
difficulty of rewarding managerial talent when managers can pick projects with long-
term or tail risk and the market allows them to move across firms before that risk
materializes. Intuitively, the idea is that in this situation managers have an incentive
to take large tail risks in order to raise their short-term performance and pay, while
moving rapidly from one firm to another, reducing their effective tenure at any firm
and thereby the extent to which they can be held responsible for project failures.
With such possibility of managerial churning, firms’ competition for managerial talent
induces a negative externality, insofar as each firm provides an “escape route” to the
managers of others. This is to be contrasted with the case where the market for
managerial talent is not very competitive, so that managers are more likely to be
stuck with their initial employer and their types discovered relatively early.
More specifically, we consider a setting with a continuum of firms, risk-averse
managers and scarce managerial talent. We model managerial talent as “alpha”,
that is, the ability to generate high returns without incurring high risks: lacking
such talent, managers can generate high returns only by taking correspondingly high
risks. However, risk emerges only in the long run. So managerial talent can be
identified only if managers who have chosen potentially risky projects remain for a
sufficiently long period of time with their initial employers: if they leave earlier, the
long-term performance of the projects that they have initiated may depend on the
way these projects have been managed by their successors.
In such a setting, if managers were tied to their initial employer, then over time
firms could tell apart the talented from those which are not and insure them against
the risk of finding out that they are not talented by cross-subsidizing them at the
expense of the talented ones. So there are two efficiency gains. First, there is a risk-
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sharing gain. Second, there is a gain in the allocation of managerial talent: once the
better managers are identified, they can be safely assigned to risky projects, while
the less talented ones would be constrained to take the safe ones.
However, competition for managers can prevent each of these welfare gains from
being fully realized. If firms compete aggressively with each other in the labor market
(“seeking alpha”), then managers can leave before the long-term risks that they have
incurred materialize. In particular, managers anticipate that the few managers who
are discovered over time to be the high alpha type will extract all rents from their
firms by generating competitive offers rewarding their alpha. This would prevent
firms from subsidizing the other managers. In other words, managers face skewed
performance rewards once there is a competitive labor market: high alpha types
extract all rents, and low alpha get no subsidy. Now, if risky projects have a greater
expected return (even when chosen by a manager of unknown quality) than safe ones,
then risk-averse managers are driven to choose risky rather than safe project, get a
higher pay than they would from the safe project, but then move to another firm
before the risk of their project has materialized. At the other firms, they are then
going to replicate the same behavior. In the aggregate, managers will be moving
continuously from one firm to the next, in each they will choose the risky project
irrespective of their ability to avoid (or control) the implied risks, and the talented
managers will never be identified.
Viewed in a broader perspective, one economic purpose of the firm is to gather
information about its employees’ talents and use it to allocate them efficiently to
projects. Such efficient allocation of talent is also considered to be the key role of
a competitive market for managers (see Gabaix and Landier, 2008, among others).
But, as shown by our model, when projects have risks that materialize only in the
long-term, there may be a dark side to the market for managers, as it destroys
the boundary of the firm that encapsulates its employees: short-run labor market
opportunities interfere with the long-run information gathering function of the firm.
Indeed, this dark side gets exploited by managers as they prefer to take on projects
with tail risks and use the labor market to move across firms delaying the resolution
of uncertainty about their talent.
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To summarize, competition in the market for managers generates an inefficiency
due to the contractual externality among firms. Indeed, the inefficiency is stronger
the greater is the probability that a manager who leaves his employer will be hired
by another firm. Therefore, the strength of the externality is predicted to correlate
with the turnover rate of managers. The empirical prediction is that in markets and
countries where there is greater managerial turnover, firms take greater risks, other
things being equal. They would also reap greater short-term returns, but at the cost
of inefficiently large risks. The financial sector appears to fit these criteria quite well
since trader and sales skills are highly fungible across firms.3
Hence, we also bring our analysis to bear on the current policy proposals and
interventions, primarily in the financial sector, aimed at introducing long-term fea-
tures such as clawbacks in compensation or capping the salaries and/or bonuses of
top managers (at all or at least some of the leading firms in the sector), primarily in
the financial sector. Though none of these policies explicitly addresses the manage-
rial turnover issue, we show that constraints on deferring compensation aggravate the
problem of managerial churning. We also show that an appropriately chosen salary
cap restores the employers’ ability to cross-subsidize less talented managers at the
expense of more talented ones. Thus, a salary cap can allow risk-sharing even in
a regime where the managerial market features no obstacles to mobility. The same
outcome could be obtained by “taxing mobility”, namely, charging a sufficiently large
tax on the income of managers who switch employers. This would effectively elimi-
nate ex-post competition for managerial talent (so that the tax would not be paid in
equilibrium), but may be relatively harder to implement in practice.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 lays out the structure of the model. In Section 4 we solve for the equilibrium.
In Section 5 we examine the effectiveness of various possible policy interventions.
Section 6 concludes.
3The propensity to take on tail risks appears to be related to banking revenues being increasingly
tied to trading activity relative to interest and fee based activities (Stiroh, 2004).
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2 Related literature
At a broad level, our paper is related to the large literature on executive compensation
and corporate governance. Our novelty is to focus on the role of managerial turnover
and study its effect on risk-taking. Our main result is to show that such turnover
enables managers to extract short-term rents from firms, and leads to the buildup of
inefficiently large long-term risks.
On the one hand, this result is related to the “pay without performance” view of
Bebchuk and Fried (2004). But they attribute the rent extraction to CEO control
over the board of directors and compensation committees, whereas we attribute it to
the presence of a competitive labor market which forces firms to match the outside
options of employees. On the other hand, our result presents a countervailing force
to the benefits arising from competitive labor markets through efficient matching.
Gabaix and Landier (2008) present matching models a` la Rosen (1981) in which the
rise in CEO pay is due their scarce talent and its efficient matching to larger firms.
In contrast, in our setting competition for talent among firms results in less efficient
matching of managers to projects within each firm.
The fact that managerial turnover introduces an externality across firms in setting
their compensation can be considered as a corporate governance externality which has
been the focus of several recent papers. Hermalin and Weisbach (2006) recognize that
such externalities may be one rationale for regulatory governance standards. Acharya
and Volpin (2009) and Dicks (2009) formalize this argument in a model where a firm’s
corporate governance is a strategic substitute for governance in other firms as it lowers
a manager’s reservation wages. Cheng (2009) shows that earnings management in
one firm may cause earnings management in other firms in the presence of relative
performance compensation.
In empirical work on governance externalities, Acharya, Gabarro and Volpin
(2009) show how (weak) governance can be used as a strategic tool to attract better
managers and provide empirical support for their channel. Cremers and Grinstein
(2009) document the importance of managerial turnover and its effect on compen-
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sation, focusing in particular on whether mobility is primarily within the industry
or also from outside of the industry. Using data on public firm CEOs’ turnover in
1993-2005, they document that pay for luck and relative performance compensation
is more prevalent in industries with outsider CEOs.
In contrast to these papers on governance externalities, our focus is on a dynamic
setting in which firms need time to learn about their employees and allocate them to
proper tasks, but this is hindered by managers’ ability to generate offers from other
firms before their type is fully learnt. Our setup is similar to Harris and Holmstrom
(1982), who develop a model of long-term labor contracts for risk-averse workers with
unknown ability. Our paper extends their model by exploring the implications for
the assignment of manager to a project; and the endogenous revelation of manager’s
talent. In this respect, our paper is closer to Holmstrom and Ricart I Costa (1986),
who emphasize the role of capital rationing as a way to counterbalance manager’s
incentives to overinvest in a model with career concerns.
Another dynamic setting with some similarity to ours is that of Axelson and Bond
(2009), who show that smart workers may be “too hard to manage”, because their
high outside options make them respond less to firing incentives. Finally, in another
recent paper that is related to our work, Makarov and Plantin (2010) develop a model
of active portfolio management in which fund managers may secretly gamble in order
to manipulate their reputation and attract more funds. They show that such trading
strategies may expose investors to severe losses and are more likely to occur when
fund managers are impatient, their trading skills are scalable and generate higher
profit per unit of risk. Our analysis differs from theirs in that we focus on the effect
of mobility across firms on risk-taking by managers.
Our paper is motivated by the anecdotal evidence of trader churning in the fi-
nancial sector (see Tett, 2009, cited in the introductory quote) and the competitive
“search for yield” (which we interpret as “seeking alpha”) on part of financial firms.
The financial crisis of 2007-09 has provided a rich laboratory to learn how compen-
sation and governance may have affected risk-taking, especially the buildup of tail
risks in the financial sector during 2003-07. Rajan (2005) was one of the first to warn
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about excessive risk taking in financial institutions driven by short-termist pay pack-
ages, what he termed as “fake alpha” in Rajan (2008). However, as of yet there is
lack of full agreement on the role of pay packages in the financial sector’s risk-taking.
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) present evidence that bank CEOs lost a significant
portion of their long-run compensation that was in the form of restricted stock-based
pay and conclude thus that pay excesses were not the likely cause of the risk-taking
at financial firms. Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2009) contend this view, by doc-
umenting that bank CEOs, including those of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers,
had paid out to themselves huge payoffs prior to the crisis and that these payoffs far
exceeded the amounts they lost eventually. So they argue that bank management did
benefit from short-term compensation that was not tied to long-run performance, as
is the case in our model with managerial churning.
Chen, Hong and Scheinkman (2009) also present evidence linking compensation
and risk-taking at financial firms over the period 1992-2008 that is consistent with
payouts to top management being tied to short-term risk-taking incentives for at least
a fraction of firms – an outcome that they attribute to the influence of institutional
investors (who turn over their holdings relatively more frequently). Acharya, Coo-
ley, Richardson and Walter (2009) argue that during 2003-07 a new banking model
emerged, prone to “manufacturing tail risks”, largely in response to to the mispricing
of government guarantees accorded to too-large-to-fail financial institutions and the
erosion of bank franchise values in traditional interest and fee businesses.
None of these papers examine explicitly the role of employee turnover in generat-
ing risk-taking incentives. The introductory quote by Tett (2009) compared the Wall
Street turnover of traders and salesmen to the poaching of players across football
clubs and recognizes that the real issue in addressing compensation in the financial
industry is that of addressing the poaching culture of employers and the related high
mobility of employees across firms. In another thought-provoking piece, Smith (2009)
explicitly refers to the role of turnover in entrenching the culture of bonus without
performance on Wall Street.4 Our model suggests that to nail down this issue, it
4An extended quote borrowed from Smith (2009) runs as follows: “In time there was significant
– 7 –
would be necessary for empirical work to also examine (depending on data availabil-
ity) compensation and turnover of traders and sales force, since their skills are most
fungible across firms and they have the greatest direct control over risk-taking.
3 Model
There are N profit-maximizing firms, which live forever and are owned by risk-neutral
principals (employers or shareholders), and a continuum of risk-averse agents (man-
agers), who live for T discrete periods. Managers maximize the expected utility,
given by U = E
[
u(W )
]
, over final (or date-T ) wealth W , where the utility function
u(W ) is increasing and concave. The assumption that managers only care about fi-
nal wealth not only avoids dealing with intertemporal optimization problems (which
are not central to the analysis), but more importantly puts no limits on deferring
compensation: payments can be deferred to the end of the employment period, at no
cost for the employer. Each employer can condition its own compensation package
on the manager’s resignation date, and as we explain below, also on managerial type
if it is learnt during the employment relationship. But the employer cannot encroach
on the future compensation that the manager may earn from subsequent employers
after resigning – a realistic assumption about the legal reach of each employment
contract.
Managers have no initial wealth and have limited liability, so that their wealth
cannot be negative at any point in time. For simplicity, there is no discounting: the
interest rate is normalized to zero.
erosion of the simple principles of the partnership days. Compensation for top managers followed
the trend into excess set by other public companies. Competition for talent made recruitment and
retention more difficult and thus tilted negotiating power further in favor of stars. Henry Paulson,
when he was CEO of Goldman Sachs, once remarked that Wall Street was like other businesses,
where 80% of the profits were provided by 20% of the people, but the 20% changed a lot from year to
year and market to market. You had to pay everyone well because you never knew what next year
would bring, and because there was always someone trying to poach your best trained people, whom
you didn’t want to lose even if they were not superstars. Consequently, bonuses in general became
more automatic and less tied to superior performance. Compensation became the industry’s largest
expense, accounting for about 50% of net revenues.”
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3.1 Projects and managers
Managers can run one new project per period. Each project is “long term”, that is,
lasts for two periods so that each manager runs two projects in steady state (except
in the first and the last periods). Not all managers are equally talented: a fraction
p ∈ (0, 1) of managers are good (type G) and a fraction 1 − p are bad (type B).
Managers themselves initially do not know their own type.
Firms are endowed with a continuum of projects of two types:
(i) safe projects S yielding y at the end of the second period, irrespective of the
ability of the manager in charge of it;
(ii) risky projects R yielding x in the first period and either 0 or −c in the second
period, depending respectively on whether it is matched with a good or bad manager.
The dependence of the risky project’s payoff on the manager’s type can be inter-
preted as a reflection of his ability in managing the risky project. Good managers
add value to a risky project by reducing its risk (for simplicity, to zero, which is the
same level as risk of the safe project), without reducing its expected payoff. In this
sense, good managers generate “alpha”, in that they improve the risk-return tradeoff
of the firm that employs them. Conversely, bad managers can generate the same
short-run return r but only at the future cost c.
A key assumption is that if a manager initiates a project of type R, his ability
becomes known only if he remains in charge of it for both periods. The assumption
that the project’s first-period performance is uninformative captures the idea that
failure is an infrequent event (“tail risk”), so that it takes time to screen a person’s
ability to manage a risky project. If each period is taken to last several years, the
wait to ascertain the quality of a match can be considerable.
By the same token, if a manager leaves after one period, the quality of the project
can no longer be gauged. We assume that the project is liquidated for its expected
value. Alternatively, the project’s completion is entrusted to a specialized department
of the company. In either case its outcome becomes totally uninformative about the
skills of the manager who initiated it. In liquidation, the project is pooled together
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with all other incomplete projects. Denoting by λ the fraction of risky projects
initiated by good managers in this pool, the average payoff of the pool is x− (1−λ)c.
Thus, if the pool of projects to be completed were initiated by a large random sample
of managers, then λ = p (by the law of large numbers). If instead the pool were
entirely made of projects started by bad managers, then λ = 0. Crucially, the payoff
x−(1−λ)c is independent of the ability of the individual initial manager, as it reflects
the skills of the average manager who left before completing his project. Therefore,
this payoff conveys no information about the quality of the manager who initiated
the project.
We assume that
x− (1− p)c > y > x− c. (1)
The left-hand side inequality indicates that the expected payoff of project R exceeds
that of project S if the manager is of unknown quality: this captures the idea that ac-
cepting a greater risk entails a higher expected return. The right-hand side inequality
indicates that the expected payoff of a safe project exceeds that of a risky one if the
manager is known to be bad. The implication of assumption (1) is that it is optimal
to assign bad managers only to safe projects, and good ones only to risky projects.
Assigning bad managers to risky projects would imply excessive risk-taking.
3.2 Market for managerial talent
In each period, the pool of projects available to a firm includes at least one safe
and one risky project per manager. Therefore, managers – not projects – are the
scarce factor of production, since only they can start a new project. Companies can
precommit to long-term wage contracts. Compensation can be contingent on (i) the
manager’s decision to stay or resign; (ii) the observed payoff of the project initiated
in the previous period (if the manager stays). As we will see, this precommitment
prevents firms from exploiting any informational advantage that they may gain over
their competitors by gauging their employees’ ability.
We assume that firms initially bid competitively for managers, anticipating their
future performance: this ensures that managers extract entirely the expected profits
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that they will generate over the course of their tenure. While ex ante there is perfect
competition for managerial talent, ex post switching costs may prevent it: over time,
managers may make location- or firm-specific investments or develop location- or
firm-specific tastes, so that it becomes difficult or impossible for other firms to poach
them. To bring out the implications of ex-post competition for managerial talent,
we will focus on the two polar cases where switching costs are either prohibitively
high – the “non-competitive regime” – or totally absent – the “competitive regime”.
In both regimes, managerial performance is assumed to be publicly observable: if a
manager’s ability becomes known to the current employer, it becomes equally known
to outside employers.5
The difference between these two regimes may be seen in practice as capturing
the changing relationship between bank managers and their employers: in the past,
banking used to entail much local knowledge, so that over their careers bank managers
developed employer- and location-specific skills; currently, banking is less local, due
to technological change and new financial products. In turn, company loyalty has
probably lost considerable appeal in the world of finance.
3.3 Time line
A representative manager lives for T periods, from 1 to T , each comprised between
two adjacent dates, from t = 0 to t = T . We denote by W (t) the compensation
agreed in the contract that he signs with the employer hiring him in period t. Recall
that we assumed that W (0) = 0 and W (t) ≥ 0,∀t. The sequence of actions is as
follows:
5However, note that this assumption is inessential in our context, due to the multiperiod nature
of the employment relationship. To see why, suppose that a manager’s performance were visible
only to his current employer. Then, in the competitive regime a manager who turned out to be
good could be hired by an outside employer, who could condition his pay on his type and assign
him to a risky project for at least two periods; in turn, the manager would not move so as to allow
the new employer to verify that he is good. So even in an opaque labor market, outside offers would
be conditioned on the manager’s true type, if this has become known to the manager (and current
employer). Thus, the real difference between the two regimes cannot reside in the private or public
nature of information about managerial performance, but in the presence or absence of barriers to
managerial mobility.
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(i) In period 1, the manager is hired by a firm that pledges to pay him a final
compensation W (1), possibly conditional on his type (if it ever becomes known) and
on his decision to stay or leave the firm in any given period. The manager is also
assigned to project S or R.
(ii) In period 2, the manager decides whether to stay with the previous employer
or switch to a new one. If he stays, the manager is assigned to a new project S or R.
At the end of the period, the project assigned in period 1 pays off. If the manager
was assigned to project S, his type remains unknown. If instead he was assigned to
project R, the second-period payoff of the initial project reveals his type. Finally, if
the manager switches to a new firm, he will receive from his new employer a newly
agreed compensation W (2), will start a new project in the new firm, and his type
remains unknown.
(iii) In any subsequent period from 3 to T − 2, the sequence of moves is the same
as under (ii) with appropriate change of time indices.
(iv) In the penultimate period T − 1, the manager is assigned to the final project
of his career (either project S or R), which he completes in period T .
Therefore, over the course of his career a manager carries out T − 1 projects, and
by the end of his career he totals a compensation that is the sum of those awarded
by the various employers that may have hired him: W =
∑T−1
t=1 W (t), where the
terms inside the sum are zero for any period t in which the manager remains with
the previous employer.
4 Equilibrium
In this section we start by considering the equilibrium choices of managers in the
two alternative settings: the non-competitive and competitive regime, respectively.
If there is no ex-post competition, good managers cannot be poached by outside em-
ployers even if their talent has been revealed by their performance with the current
employer. As in this regime good managers cannot switch to a new employer, their
equilibrium wage will not reflect their type. When the market for managers is com-
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petitive, instead, managers who have been revealed to be good may have an incentive
to switch to a new employer, and their equilibrium wage will exceed that offered to
bad managers. But in this regime there are also situations in which managers have
the incentive to leave the company immediately after undertaking a risky project, so
that their type will not be learnt. In this case, their equilibrium wage will obviously
not reflect their ability.
4.1 Non-competitive regime
In this section we show that if the market for managers is non-competitive, the
equilibrium outcome coincides with the first-best outcome. The first-best outcome
features two characteristics: (i) productive efficiency, that is, optimal allocation of
managers to projects, and (ii) optimal risk-sharing, that is, complete insurance of
managers by firms (as the latter are risk neutral).
To ensure productive efficiency, the type of managers must be learnt as early as
possible in their employment history, so as to assign bad managers to safe projects
and good ones to risky projects in every subsequent period. Since the manager will
not switch to a new employer, the optimal policy is clearly to assign him to a risky
project in periods 1 and 2 of his career and for the subsequent T − 3 periods to risky
projects if good and to safe ones if bad. This policy ensures that in expectation the
manager will generate profits (2) over his career. Any other policy would generate
lower expected profits. Formally, by assumption 1, the maximum life-time expected
profit per manager, which as of period 1 is:
Π∗ = 2 [x− (1− p)c] + (T − 3) [px+ (1− p)y] . (2)
The first term is the expected period-1 and period-2 profits from the risky project
undertaken at t = 0 and t = 1 by a manager of unknown quality (because it takes
two periods to learn manager’s type, the manager is still of unknown type at t = 1,
and hence, assigning him to the risky project yields the highest profit by assumption
1); while the second term is the sum of the expected continuation payoffs of the two
groups of managers in periods 3 through T , weighted by their respective frequencies.
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To guarantee optimal risk-sharing, managers must be paid a fixed compensation,
i.e. a salary that is not contingent on their quality. Under our assumption of ex-ante
competition among firms, managers extract the entire social surplus, so that on a
per-period basis their compensation must equal the average future profit that they
will generate:
w∗ = Π∗/ (T − 1) = px+ (1− p)2(x− c) + (T − 3)y
T − 1 . (3)
So managers’ final wealth is W = Π∗ and their utility is
U∗ = u(Π∗), (4)
while firms earn zero expected profits. Notice that w∗ ∈ (y, x): the first-best per-
period salary is comprised of the profit generated by the safe project and the highest
profit generated by a risky project. In the non-competitive regime, this salary cannot
be outbid by outside employers even for managers who have been recognized to be
good.
This argument proves the following result:
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium under no competition) Without ex-post competi-
tion for managers, the first-best outcome is attained in equilibrium.
Note that optimal risk-sharing requires the firm not to condition the salary on the
quality of the employees, even though it uses this information in allocating them to
different types of projects. This implies that good managers will subsidize bad ones,
but in the non-competitive regime, the assumption is that switching costs prevent
them from leaving the company to avoid paying this subsidy.
4.2 Competitive market for managers
When there is ex-post competition for managerial talent, the first-best allocation
characterized above may no longer be an equilibrium. Before we show this, we state
a tie-breaking assumption: a manager prefers to stay with his current employer if the
outside employer’s offer is not strictly better than his current compensation. This
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assumption can be motivated with the presence of a tiny switching cost even in the
competitive case.
The key observation is that ompetition changes the outside options for managers
who chose the risky project and remained at least two periods with an employer:
since in this case outside employers can infer the manager’s ability, they will bid the
wage up to x for good managers, and offer y to bad ones. Since the first-best salary
w∗ in (3) is smaller than x and greater than y, good managers will leave, while the bad
ones will stay. Hence, the salary w∗ would entail losses for the initial employer, and
the cross-subsidization required to provide optimal risk-sharing becomes infeasible.
Notice, however, that the initial employer can offer a contract that is more effective
in deterring good managers from leaving. The most effective such contract (consistent
with zero expected profits) is one that makes the entire date-T compensation Π∗
contingent on the manager never leaving the firm. In other words, the firm will pay
nothing if the manager leaves at any time in his career.6 Consider a manager who
has been revealed to be good in period 2. If he were to stay with the initial employer,
his final wealth would be Π∗. If instead he were to leave at the end of period 2, he
would earn a final wealth (T −3)x from the new employer, given that there is perfect
competition. The comparison between (T −3)x and Π∗ yields a cutoff value T̂ , which
defines the maximum time horizon that allows the firm to retain its managers through
the contract just described:
T̂ = 3 + 2
x− (1− p)c
(1− p)(x− y) . (5)
If T ≤ T̂ the first-best allocation can be sustained even in the competitive regime,
while if T > T̂ it cannot. Intuitively, if the manager’s employment horizon T is very
short, then he must spend a large fraction of his remaining career with an employer
just to be recognized as being of good quality: in the extreme, if his career were
to span three periods (T = 3), he would spend 2/3 of it proving his quality to the
initial employer and only 1/3 with a new one; since T̂ > 3, the new employer would
not be able to offer him a sufficiently attractive deal. Hence, the first-best would be
6Recall that, having zero initial wealth and limited liability, the manager cannot be penalized
more than this.
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feasible. If instead the manager is younger, i.e., T > T̂ , then the contract that defers
all compensation Π∗ to the final date T and pays nothing if the manager resigns at
any time, would not deter the manager from leaving. Then, the first-best would not
be feasible.
It is instructive to see how this cutoff value responds to changes in the other two
main parameters of the problem. In Panel A of Figure 1, we show that an increase in
the fraction of good managers, p, expands the range of values of T for which the first-
best allocation can be achieved (for instance, for p very close to 1 it can be achieved
even for very large T ): intuitively, the cost of subsidizing bad managers is quite low
because there are few of them. In Panel B, instead, we see that an increase in the
excess profitability of a well-managed risky project over that of a safe one, x − y,
reduces the range of values of T for which the first-best allocation can be achieved:
when these excess profits are large, outside employers can lure away a good manager
even if his remaining job tenure is relatively short.
The previous argument focused on a manager who switches employer at the end
of period 2. But a manager who does not want to switch to a new employer at that
point in time will not want to deviate later, since the profits from quitting would be
even lower. Moreover, no manager will want to switch employer at the end of period
1, since at that time he would still be of unknown quality for an outside employer:
therefore, switching would not yield a better offer from another employer, and may
lead to penalty by his initial employer paying him zero.
The following proposition summarizes the results so far:
Proposition 2 (First-best region under competition) With a competitive
managerial market, the first-best outcome can be attained in equilibrium if and only
if the manager’s employment horizon is sufficiently short, i.e. T ≤ T̂ , where T̂ is
defined by expression (5).
Recall that an important assumption made in deriving this result is that there
are no constraints on withholding compensation to a manager who resigns. In prac-
tice, however, legal restrictions assumed away in the previous argument may exist:
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it may be illegal to write an employment contract where the manager is denied any
compensation for past employment just because he chooses to switch to a new em-
ployer. This is also because in practice at least a portion of the total compensation
is paid in the form of salary, to fund intermediate consumption (possibly because
otherwise managers would be unable to achieve the desired consumption smooth-
ing due to borrowing constraints). In conjunction with limited liability, such salary
payments could not be reclaimed by the initial employer, and therefore they reduce
the parameter region where the first-best can be attained, compared to the region
described in Proposition 2. Intuitively, the more the firm is constrained in deferring
compensation, the lower is the penalty that it can threaten to inflict on resigning
managers, and therefore the smaller is the parameter region for which it can attain
the same employees’ loyalty as in the non-competitive regime – and offer the implied
risk-sharing to them. This point is formally stated in the following result:
Corollary 1 (First-best region with limited pay deferral) If part of the total
compensation is paid as non-recoverable per-period salary w > 0, the maximum time
horizon for which the first-best outcome can be attained is:
T̂ (w) = 3 + 2
x− (1− p)c− w
(1− p)(x− y) , (6)
which is strictly decreasing in w.
What happens when the first-best cannot be attained, that is, when T > T̂? To
answer this question, we need to consider the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
model. In each period t the manager chooses whether to stay or to leave, while
the firm chooses whether to assign him to the safe or the risky project. Every time
a manager is hired, perfect competition among firms implies that he is offered the
contract that maximizes his continuation utility, conditional on the information on
the manager’s quality available at that stage. The contract specifies the manager’s
final compensation, conditional on him staying or leaving, and conditional on his type
(if known). Given that the market for managers is perfectly competitive, the contract
that maximizes the manager’s continuation utility must also yield the same utility
that the manager would obtain from leaving (in other words, his outside option).
– 17 –
In the proof of Proposition 3 we will focus on the following candidate equilibrium:
the manager is assigned to project R and changes employer in every period for the first
K periods, earning the expected payoff x− (1− p)c per period, with K ∈ {0, T − 3}.
After being hired by the employer in period K + 1, he is assigned to project R in
period K + 1 and K + 2, earning the expected payoff x− (1− p)c in each of the two
periods. From period K + 3 onwards, the manager is assigned to project R if found
to be good, earning x per period, and project S otherwise, earning y per period.
Hence, given K, the manager’s expected utility is
pu (WG) + (1− p)u (WB) . (7)
where WG ≡ (K + 2) [x− (1− p)c] + (T − 3 − K)x, is the final wealth of a good
manager, and WB ≡ (K + 2) [x− (1− p)c] + (T − 3 − K)y, is the final wealth of
a bad manager. The critical variable in this choice is K, the number of periods in
which the manager “churns” jobs. Churning is a way for the manager to delay the
revelation of his type and thus obtain insurance. This comes at the cost of greater
inefficiency, as the bad types should be assigned to the safe project rather than the
risky one. Therefore, the trade-off is between insurance, which is obtained with delay
of type revelation or the choice of a higher K, and productive efficiency, which comes
with earlier type revelation or a lower K. If K = 0, the manager does not leave the
firm after the first period. He is given very limited insurance but achieves productive
efficiency. Conversely, if K = T − 3, the manager achieves perfect insurance, at the
cost of very limited productive efficiency. The optimal K maximizes the expression
(7) above.
Proposition 3 (Churning equilibrium region under competition) With a
competitive managerial market, for T > T̂ the equilibrium outcome is as follows: the
manager is assigned to project R and changes employer in every period for the first
K∗ periods. Afterwards, he stays with the employer and is assigned to project R in
periods K∗ + 1 and K∗ + 2, and from period K∗ + 3 onwards to project R if he is
good and project S if he is bad. K∗ is such that
u′ (2 [x− (1− p)c] + (T − 3)y +K∗ [x− (1− p)c− y])
u′ (2 [x− (1− p)c] + (T − 3)x−K∗(1− p)c) =
pc
x− y − (1− p)c. (8)
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Proof: The proof of this result is organized in three steps. First, recall that the
optimal allocation of projects is to assign a risky project to managers that are good
and of unknown type; while managers of bad quality only should be assigned to safe
projects. This result follows from the assumption that the output associated with
the assignment of a risky project to a manager of unknown quality, x − (1 − p)c, is
greater than the output associated with a safe project, y.
Second, given that firms are perfectly competitive ex ante and ex post, they pay
all rents to managers. Hence, a manager of good quality is paid x per period; while a
manager of bad quality is paid y per period. Instead, a manager of unknown quality
is paid x− (1− p)c.
Third, as the only reason to leave a firm is to preserve uncertainty about one’s
type, in a given period t ∈ [2, T − 1] churning makes sense only if in all periods t′ < t,
the manager has chosen to churn. Otherwise, his type is already known and there
is no reason to churn. Conversely, if a manager chooses to stay in a given period
t ∈ [2, T − 1], he has no reason to leave in all periods t′′ > t. This is because his type
is already known and again there is no reason to churn. Therefore, the subgame-
perfect equilibrium simplifies to the optimal choice of the number of periods K of
churning that maximizes manager’s expected utility in expression (7) above.
The first order condition is
−pu′ (WG) (1− p)c+ (1− p)u′ (WB) [x− y − (1− p)c] = 0, (9)
where WG ≡ (K+2) [x− (1− p)c]+(T −3−K)x and WB ≡ (K+2) [x− (1− p)c]+
(T − 3−K)y. The first term is negative (WG is decreasing in K), while the second
is positive by assumption (1) (WB is increasing in K). The second order condition
is satisfied as
pu′′ (WG) [(1− p)c]2 + (1− p)u′′ (WB) [x− y − (1− p)c]2 < 0
given that u′′ (·) < 0.
The equilibrium is described graphically in Figure 2 in the space (WG,WB). Point
A on the 45o line represents the final wealth obtained by churning for T − 3 periods:
– 19 –
in such case the manager obtains the same wealth independently on its type. Point
B in the figure represents instead the case in which the manager chooses not to
churn. In such a case his final wealth if his type is good (WG) is much greater than
his wealth if his type is bad (WB). By setting the number of churning periods K
between 0 and T − 3, the manager can choose any point on the line between A
and B. The optimal choice on that line depends on the probability of being a good
type p and the utility function u(.): in particular, it depends on the marginal rate
of substitutions between the two states of the world (the state in which the type is
Good and the state in which the type is Bad) and thus on the degree of risk-aversion
of manager. Intuitively, a more risk-averse manager will choose a higher K to smooth
consumption more between the two states. A less risk averse manager will choose a
lower K to maximize expected wealth. As shown in the graph the solution is point
C, where the indifference curves of the manager are tangent to the segment A-B.
Proposition 3 has a testable cross-sectional prediction: that all else equal, that
is, with same residual uncertainty about type, junior managers are more likely to
churn than senior ones, and therefore more likely to be associated with excess risk-
taking by firms (indeed, if type uncertainty were greater for juniors, it would only
strengthen their incentives to churn). Since in the equilibrium with competition
K∗ can be taken as a measure of the pervasiveness of churning, it is interesting to
investigate how it responds to changes in the parameters of the problem. We establish
these comparative statics results for the case in which managers have a power utility
function:
Proposition 4 (Comparative statics in the churning equilibrium) If man-
agers have a power utility function u(w) = w
1−γ
1−γ (with γ ≥ 0), then the optimal
number of churning periods is
K∗ = max
{
(T − 3) (x− gy)− 2 (g − 1) [x− (1− p)c]
g [x− y − (1− p)c] + (1− p)c , 0
}
, (10)
where g ≡
[
pc
x−y−(1−p)c
] 1
γ
> 1. K∗ is increasing in the managers’ employment horizon
T and degree of relative risk-aversion γ, and is decreasing in the cost of project
completion c.
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Proof: The result that in (10) K∗ is increasing in T is immediate. To establish the
other results, first notice that clearly g is decreasing in γ. Then, differentiating (10)
with respect to g, we find
dK∗
dg
= −{[2 [x− (1− p)c] + (T − 3)y] [g(x− y)− (g − 1) (1− p)c]
+ [(T − 3) (x− gy)− 2 (g − 1) [x− (1− p)c]] [x− y − (1− p)c]}
· [g(x− y)− (g − 1) (1− p)c]−2 .
This derivative is negative, because all the terms in square brackets are positive. It
follows that K∗ is increasing in γ. Next, the derivative of (10) with respect to c is
dK∗
dc
= −2 [x+ gy − 2(1− p)c] + (T − 3) (x− gy)
[g(x− y)− (g − 1) (1− p)c]2 (1− p) (g − 1)
+
1
γ
pg
1
γ
−1 x− y
[x− y − (1− p)c]2
dK∗
dg
< 0.
since dK∗/dg < 0 (as just shown). 
These results are intuitive. A longer employment horizon T makes the manager
more averse to revealing his type, because the implied risk refers to a larger future
cash flow, and therefore induces him to churn for a longer interval. By the same
token, a more risk-averse manager will seek more insurance, and therefore churn
longer. The cost of project completion c has the opposite effect, since it captures an
efficiency loss arising from the manager’s departure and therefore can be regarded as
the cost of churning (which they pay for in their wages).
4.3 Extensions
We have assumed so far that it is firms that assign managers to risky or safe projects.
This assumption can be easily relaxed. Because managers receive all value added
from the projects, the results would not change if they could choose the projects
themselves. In fact, a bad manager would efficiently choose a safe project; while the
other managers (whether good or of unknown type) would choose the risky project,
as they are the projects that maximize their utility.
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In contrast, the assumption of symmetric information between firms and man-
agers is critical. If managers knew their type, then there would be no insurance in
equilibrium that can be obtained through churning. In fact, good managers would
stay in their initial firm so that they are revealed as good and can enjoy higher pay.
Bad managers would then also be revealed and assigned to safe projects from period
2 onwards.
Finally, the assumption that firms can commit to a long-term incentive scheme
does not affect the solution in the presence of a competitive market for managers. In
fact, the competitive market for managers makes sure that at any point in time the
firm pays the manager the entire value added that they produce. However, in the
case of no competition, lack of commitment by the firm implies that the firm extracts
all the value added produced by managers. In other words, while firms can insure
managers, they do so by driving managerial utility down to the reservation value
(which is normalized to zero in the model). Hence, managers are better off without
competition for managers when firms can commit but prefer competition when firms
cannot commit. We leave the analysis of this latter case for future research.
4.3.1 Learning about manager’s type
Let c be stochastic: c˜ = C with probability pi and c˜ = 0 otherwise, where pi is a
very small probability and C is a large loss (tail risk). After the observation of a
loss C, the firm learns for sure that the manager is of bad quality, p0 = 1. If instead
the manager stays for 2 periods and the firm observes a realization c˜ = 0, the firm
updates the probability that the manager is of good quality. Using Bayes’ rule,
p1 ≡ Pr(G|c˜t = 0) = Pr(c˜t = 0|G) Pr(G)
Pr(c˜t = 0|G) Pr(G) + Pr(c˜t = 0|B) Pr(B) =
p
p+ (1− pi) (1− p) > p
In general, such updating happens after the observation of nth realization of c˜ = 0
following n− 1 realizations of c˜ = 0:
pn =
p
p+ (1− pi) (1− p)pn−1 =
(
p
p+ (1− p)pi
)n−1
p ≡ ξn−1p
The critical difference in this setup is that, even if a manager stops churning after K
periods, his type is not necessarily learnt immediately. In particular, the expected
– 22 –
productivity (and thus the outside option) of a manager that had n realization of
c˜ = 0 is x− (1− pn)c.
In this setup, a good type will receive a final wealth
WG ≡ (K + 2) [x− (1− p)c] + (T − 3−K) (x− c) + pc
T−3−K∑
i=1
ξi
The critical difference from the case before is the last term: each period n ∈
{1, T −K − 3} after the first K+2 period the good manager accumulates his outside
option x− (1− pn)c, where pn is given above.
The final wealth of a bad manager depends on whether (and when) he is found
out for sure, that is, it depends on whether c˜ = C at any point in time in his career.
If a bad manager is found out j periods after K + 2 with j ∈ {0, T −K − 4}, his
final wealth is
W jB ≡ (K + 2) [x− (1− p)c] + (T − 3−K)y − j(y + c− x) + pc
j∑
i=1
ξi
In fact, he accumulates his outside option x − (1 − pn)c each period between 1 and
j and he is assigned to the safe task for all remaining periods T − 3−K − j. Each
of these cases happen with probability pi (1− pi)j. If he is lucky enough to avoid any
realization of c˜ = C (which happens with probability (1− pi)T−3−K) then his final
wealth is equal to WG above.
The manager’s problem is to maximize his expected utility as a function of K:
max
K
[
p+ (1− p) (1− pi)T−3−K
]
u (WG) + (1− p)
T−4−K∑
j=0
pi (1− pi)j u (W jB) .
As in the basic case, WG is decreasing in K while W
j
B is increasing in K. Hence,
intuitively the same results can be derived in this case.
5 Policy interventions
The model presented in the previous sections highlights that competition for manage-
rial talent induces inefficiencies in two ways: first, it limits risk-sharing opportunities
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that firms can offer to managers; second, it induces excess risk taking and therefore
a loss of productive efficiency. In this section we consider which policy interventions
can limit or eliminate these inefficiencies. Such public interventions are warranted
by the fact that in our churning equilibrium, no individual bank has the incentive to
deviate and unilaterally stop competing for other banks’ managers: in the words of
the initial quote by Tett (2009), banks “feel utterly trapped”, and only the interven-
tion of a public authority (such as FIFA for soccer) can stop banks from poaching
employees from each other.
5.1 Clawbacks and long-term indexing
Several recent proposals to reform managerial compensation in financial institutions
are based on the idea that it would be desirable to defer (“claw back”) a part of
the managerial compensation and index this deferred compensation to long-term
managerial performance. The idea behind such proposals is to address excess risk-
taking. Note that excess risk-taking also arises in our “churning equilibrium”. Hence,
it is desirable to discourage managers from taking projects that are likely to be highly
profitable in the short run but feature “tail risk”.
However, in our benchmark setting deferring compensation would be inconse-
quential. The model places no constraints on deferral of managerial compensation:
indeed, in the above analysis compensation is already assumed to be paid at the end
of the manager’s career. Even in the churning equilibrium, it is inessential whether in
each period the employer pays the manager’s compensation for that period or defers
it to some future date: the essential point is that the compensation cannot be made
contingent on the manager’s type. In such an equilibrium, long-term indexing would
be ineffective, because the past performance of the manager is uninformative about
his type (his “true alpha”).
It is true instead that anything that constrains the firms’ ability to defer com-
pensation is inefficient. As shown by Corollary 3, if for some exogenous reason firms
cannot defer compensation entirely and make payments contingent on the employees’
loyalty, then the parameter region where the first-best outcome obtains shrinks.
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5.2 Salary caps
Another very frequently mentioned policy proposal is to impose a cap on managerial
compensation. How would such a policy change the equilibrium in our model with
managerial competition? Specifically, would it make churning – and the associated
excess risk taking – less attractive to managers?
Suppose that policy-makers were to introduce a salary cap on the per-period
compensation of managers, at the first-best level w∗. Such a cap would indeed prevent
employers from poaching high-quality managers from each other in the competitive
regime, and make the perfect risk-sharing and no-churning outcome sustainable in
equilibrium. To see this, consider the candidate equilibrium where each employer
offers the wage w∗ to all his managers, and assigns them optimally once their type
becomes known. Then, due to the salary cap, a competing employer could not poach
the managers who have proved to be good from their current employer. Moreover,
churning for K periods would not be an equilibrium: in that case, on a per-period
basis he would earn utility (7) which is smaller than the first-best utility u(Π∗), so
that he would not deviate from an employer who offered him w∗.
So a binding price cap would guarantee efficient risk-sharing between employees by
shutting down competition for good managers. It would also simultaneously ensure
the avoidance of excess risk-taking by firms, since it would discourage managers from
churning across firms to avoid revealing their true ability. This highlights that current
policy proposals about caps on the pay of top managers of financial institutions may
have an efficiency rationale, not just a basis in ethical and political concerns (though
this efficiency rationale is yet to be spelled out by those proposing caps). Indeed,
according to the model, an appropriately set pay cap would raise the expected utility
of managers themselves.
5.3 Taxing mobility
An effect similar to that of a salary cap could be achieved by a tax on managerial
mobility: suppose that the compensation of a manager who switches to a new em-
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ployer were taxed at a higher rate than that of a loyal manager. If the tax is set at
a sufficiently high rate, it would effectively move the economy to the first-best even
if the managerial labor market is competitive, as it would effectively block ex-post
competition for managerial talent. Note that such a tax would never be paid in equi-
librium, since managers would not switch to other employers. Therefore, the policy
prescription arising from the model is to “throw sand in the wheels of the managerial
labor market”.
To see this, consider the equilibrium where each employer pays the first-best
compensation Π∗ to all his managers, and assigns them optimally once their type
becomes known. After the first two periods, managers learn their type. Hence, the
good manager could leave and obtain a utility u((T − 3)x). As shown in Section 4,
this deviation is profitable if T > T̂ , where T̂ is given in (5). Then, a tax on mobility
τ ≥ u((T − 3)x)− u(Π∗) (11)
would prevent this deviation. Notice this condition would also ensure that there is no
deviation after the third period because the benefits of deviating in period H > 2 (i.e.
u((T − 1−H)x)) decreases in H while the cost of deviating (i.e. the loss of u(Π∗))
does not change. With such a tax on mobility (11), a competing employer could not
poach the managers who have proved to be good from their current employer.
5.4 Investments in “alpha”
As discussed above, both a salary cap and the equivalent tax on managerial mobility
would redistribute income from good to bad managers. In the current setting this
redistribution prevents managerial churning and facilitates productive allocation of
talent. We note, however, that the redistribution could have a negative effect on
efficiency in a richer setting in which managers invest in their quality ex ante at a
private cost – for instance, by taking an MBA they can raise their probability p of
being a good manager. In this case, capping their salary – and therefore their lifetime
compensation – would reduce the “average alpha” of managers in equilibrium.
Moreover, in the real world preventing reallocation of managerial talent may have
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efficiency costs that are not captured by the present model: if both managers and
firms are heterogeneous, they may both learn gradually about the quality of their
match, so that it may be efficient for bad matches to be dissolved and new ones
be formed. Also, limiting or preventing managerial mobility may confer market
power to firms, and thereby create holdup problems. In our setting, this would be
inconsequential because of ex-ante competition, but in reality this assumption may
not hold either. Such considerations are worthy of further modeling in the context
of our setup which focused exclusively on one dark side to managerial mobility.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we showed that the market for managers has a dark side, in that it
allows them to take on projects with short-term rewards at the cost of exposing
firms to long-run or tail risks, since they can move across firms before these risks
are realized. If the market for managers is effectively shut (for example, due to
firm-specificity of managerial investments), then the outcome is improved in that it
features less inefficient risk-taking. This is associated with two benefits: (i) firms
can learn about their managers’ types over time and use this information to achieve
production gains, because employees do not leave; and, (ii) firms can offer insurance
gains to their employees, because the better employees can be used ex post to subsi-
dize the worse ones, and thereby all employees can be insured against the risk arising
from the value of their own human capital ex ante. We do not intend to suggest that
there is no economic value to the market for managers and employees, but simply
highlighting the counterintuitive possibility that the market for managerial mobility
pierces through essential firm boundaries and fundamentally interferes with firms’
ability to generate information about employees.
Besides our theoretical contribution that is especially suitable for understanding
risk-taking in the financial sector, our line of research also suggests an empirical one.
The immediate testable prediction of our model is that there should be a positive
correlation over time between the mobility of senior managers and traders across
financial institutions and their risk-taking. Moreover, according to the model, cross-
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sectional differences between managers can make some of them more prone to switch
jobs than others, for instance, because – in keeping with the model – they are at the
start of their careers and have a lower degree of firm loyalty and firm-specificity of
skills. Then our analysis implies a second testable prediction: the larger risks taken
by financial institutions should be systematically related to the subset of managers
(e.g., young traders with substantial type uncertainty) that are more likely to move
across financial institutions. In other words, the hypothesis is that there is a group of
highly rewarded managers who specialize in taking tail risks and move rapidly across
employers.7 We plan to pursue empirically the full set of testable implications of our
model in future research.
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Panel A. First-best equilibrium, career duration (T) and fraction of good managers (p) 
 
 
 
Panel B. First-best equilibrium, career duration (T) and excess return of risky project (x-y) 
 
 
Figure 1. First-best equilibrium region 
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Figure 2. Churning equilibrium 
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